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INDEX TO POINTS IN ARGUMENT
Point No. 1. The Court erred in refusing defendant's requested instruction No. 1 requesting said Court
to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty
for the following reasons:
(a) There is no evidence to show that the intoxication of the defendant, assuming it to be proved, or
the speed of defendant's car, assuming it to be proved,
or any other careless or reckless act of defendant,
assuming their proof, was the cause of the death of
l\{r. Allen, and there is no evidence to show the causal
connection between any unlawful or negligent act of
defendant causing said death ------------------------------------ 6-13
Point No. 2. The Court erred in refusing to give
defendant's requested instruction No. 12 which reads:
If you find that Mr. Allen was negligent in crossing
the highway so that he could not cross with reasonable
safety in front of defendant's automobile, then his acts
were the sole proximate cause of his death and the
defendant must be acquitted ------------------------------------ 13-14
Point No. 3. The Court erred in refusing to give
defendant's requested instruction No. 4, which reads:
Whether your verdict shall be guilty or not guilty
is for you to determine, but if, after considering the
evidence, you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the. injuries suffered by Ruben Allen were due to
grossly negligent, wanton and reckless acts of the defendant in operating his car, your verdict should be
guilty. If. however, you believe that the defendant was
operating his car while under the influence of liquor,
but was then exercising due and proper care and caution,
and was therefore, not guilty of grossly negligent, wanton, or reckless acts proximately causing injury to the
deceased and his death, your verdict should be not
gtlil ty. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14
Point No. 4. The Court erred in refusing to· give
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defendant's requested instruction No· 10 which reads:
You are instructed, gentle1nen of the jury, that the defendant had a right to assume that a person upon the
higlnvay 'vould exercise ordinary care, and that they
\vould not negligently expose thernselves to danger, and
that they 'vould exercise ordinary care to ascertain
the approach of 1notor vehicles, and before you hold
that the defendant \vas negligent in this case, you must
take into consideration these assun1ptions 'vhich the
def~ndant had right to rely on. --.. --:·--------------------~------ 14-15
Point No. 5. The Court erred in given instruction
X o. 10 and 'vhich reads: If you find that Mr. Allen was
negligent in crossing the highway so that he could not
cross \Yith reasonable safety, in front of defendant's
auton1obile, and that ~Ir. Read \vas not negligent in
any "~ay, then nir . ..~..t\..llen 's negligence becomes the sole
proximate cause of his death- and the defendant should
he acquitted. _____ _____ _______ ___ __ ___ ____ __ __ __ __ ____ ____ ____ ___________ _____ ___ 15-16
Point No. 6. The Court erred in denying defendant's 1notion for arrest of judgment on the ground that
there y,~as no offense proved in the cause. ______________ 16-17
Point No. 7· The Court erred in refusing to give
defendant's part of requested instruction No. 1% and
\vhich reads as follo,vs:
"You are instructed in this conection, however, that
the Inere fact that you believe from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony, and that \Vhile
committing such unlawful act, the defendant caused
the death of a living human being, such is not sufficient
to _sustain a charge of manslaughter. There must be
in addition, a causal connection bet\veen the unlavvful
aet and death. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 17-18
Point No. 8. The Court erred in refusing the defendant's request not to submit said cause to the jury
, at all on the grounds that there is no evidence said
1\.llen died because of said collision. ---------------------------- 18
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Point No. 9. The Court erred in permitting testiInony and exhibit ''A'' to be introduced as to automobile
skid marks.
(a) that there was no testimony or evidence which
showed said purported skid marks were made by defendant's automobile that he was driving at time of
accident. ..... --------------------___ -------------------.. -----.--------------------- 18-20
Point No. 10. The Court erred in permitting one
Ronald Hadfield to give testimony as to the speed of
defendant's car or any car at the time of accident or
immediately thereafter from length of skid marks for
the following reasons and to which defendant duly excepted:
(a) There was no evidence to show defendant made
such skid marks.
(b) There was no evidence to show the number of
skid marks made.
(c) There was no testimony on voir dire or otherwise to show that said Hadfield was qualified to compute the speed of a car from the skid marks made· __ 18-20
Point No. 11. The Court erred in submitting to
the jury subparagraphs 3, 4 and 5 of instruction No. 2,
which were in the form of questions and to which defendant duly accepted -------------------------------------------------- 18-20
(3) At the time of the accident, was the defendant
operating his car at a speed of about fifty miles per
hour while he was then under the influence of intoxicating liquor and without keeping any lookout as to
where he was going, and without having said automoible
under control'
(4) Did such acts, if any, on the part of said defendant, constitute criminal negligence'
(5) Was said criminal negligence, if any you find,
the proximate cause of the accident and resulting death?
Point No. 12. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial -------------------------------------- 20-21
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
State of l; tah
Plaintiff and Respondent
-vsBudd Jay Read,

Defendant and . A.ppellant.

I
)

APELLANT'S
BRIEF
Case No.
883

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action against the defendant, Budd Jay
Read, charging him with the commission of the crime
of involuntary manslaughter on the 6th day of September A.D. 1951 in Cache County, State of Utah in "\vords
as follo,vs:
That on the 6th day of September, A. D. 1951, at
Cache County, State of Utah, the said defendant did
then and there unlawfully and "vithout malice kill Ruben
F. Allen contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the
State aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
Subsequent to the filing of the information, a bill
of particulars "vas supplied upon demand (9)·
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.t\ preliminary hearing \Vas had before the City
(jonrt on the 19th day of Septen1ber A. D. 1951, and
tlH~

defendant \Vas bound over to the District Court for

trial.
rrhe case was tried before the Court sitting with a

jury on the 8th and 9th of October, A. D. 1951. At the
conclusion of the trial the defendant requested the Court
by \Y ritten request to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty which was refused by the Court (17).
The ju1·~r \vas instructed, arguments made and the defendant found guilty as charged (31).
A n1otion for a new trial (32) was filed by the defendant and the same was heard and denied on the 18th
day of October, _.A_. D. 1951 by the said Court and on
the san1e day defendant \vas ~entenced by the Court
(Tr. 227-228). Notice of appeal \Vas then served and
filed by the defendant. ( Tr. 34).

rrhc• evidence shows by the plaintiff's 0\Vn ·witnesses, ,\~ho sa\Y the accident, that at about the hour
of 5 P·~L on Septe1nber 6th, A. D. 1951, as· the defendant
\vas proceding in a northerly direction bet,veen 5th and
6th North, on Main Street, Logan, Utah and on the east
side of the said street, Rueben F. Allen ean1e acros~
said ~fain Street on a bicycle and inter.cepted the defendant's vehicle on the east side of said street and in
about the middle of the block (Tr. 45-46) according to
Ingrid Bjorkman, the State's first eye witness. That
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Allen appeared to look to neither right nor left as he
caine aeross the street fro1n the \vest but \Vas lookip.g
8traight ahead ( Tr. 185) \Yhich \vould be in a easterly
direction. ~-\ccording to the State's second eye witness
to the fatal aeident, a one ~Ir. Clark,- who \vas standing
on the east side of said street and \Vithin a few feet
froin place of accident, )[r. Allen started fro1n the west
side of the road and caine across in a southeasterly
direction on his wheel ( 15-!, 155, 159), and said Allen
appeared to be looking in the direction he "\vas going.
That it further appears from said Clark's testimony
that he observed both defendant and deceased about the
san1e time and \vhich placed Allen near curb on "\vest
side of street and defendant about lj2 block south of
the plaee of accident. It should be further· mentioned
in regards to the State's first witness, Mrs. Bjorkman,
that she ,,. as coming out of a driveway in her car
just north of a Safeway store, which is situated in
about the middle of block running between 5th and 6th
North on ~fain Street and on east side thereof and observing defendant coming about lf2 block to her south,
stopped her car at the curb line to await defendant's
passing (Tr. 43, 44, 45). That she, as well as Mr. Clark,
was on the east side of said street when she stopped her
car (Tr. 43). That the body was carried on fender of
defendant's car and rolled off in front of her car (Tr.
46).
The Court permitted a map to be introduced which
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purported to show part of the street block in question and

which further purported to show skid marks over the
objection of defendant (Tr. 42) until a proper foundation had ben laid and as showing they were skid marks
1nade by defendant's car (Tr. 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25) and
that only two skid marks were shown (Tr. 20). The
defense further objected to State's witness Tolman testifying as to rneasurements of purported skid marks
from a 1nemorandum taken from an original memorandum at scene of accident and not from his recollection
the original not being in Court but was overruled (Tr.
28). That we further objected to testimony of Mrs.
Bjorkman as to skid marks, no foundation having been
laid but "\Vere overruled (Tr. 48) and she couldn't say
skid marks were those of defendant's car (Tr. 62). We
further objected to Captain Hadfield testifying as to
skid marks as no proper foundation had been laid as
showing they were defendant's but were overruled by
the Court (Tr. 122, 123, 126, 127). We further objected
to the Court allowing said officer Hadfield to testify as
to the speed of defendant's car from the skid marks
purportedly 1nade by his car right after the accident
because said Hadfield could not say as to whether there
were 1, 2, 3 or 4 skid marks made and of course not
being able to say no proper foundation was laid as it is
conceded by sajd Hadfield that the less skid marks the
longer they will be under the sarne speed and conditions
(Tr. 137, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147) nor that said Hadfield
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had ~ho\vn hilu~elf to be an expert in co1nputing speed
fro1n length of skid Inarks (Tr. 149)·
There "'-as evidence sub1nitted by one witness, that
in hi~ opinion the defendant \vas intoxicated. (Tr. 79).
The defendant testified that he had had a bottle of beer
and a glass of beer. (Tr. 190). The defendant testified a~ to the accident thus: '' ~-\., \Veil, when I got to
Safe,vays I see a car con1ing out of the parking lot,
and it \\Tas not coming fast, but it \Vas still 1noving.
and I watched to see if that \Vas going to continue coining. I had my foot over the brake at the time, and
when the car came to a stop I continued on, and at that
. time \Vas about \vhen accident hapened, I just looked
straight ahead again, and I couldn't avoid missing
hi cycle (Tr. 191 ). '' Deceased \Vas at ;.that time about 6
feet in front of defendant (191) and that before he sa\v
il:Irs. Bjorlanan coming out of driveway to north of
Safeway store he was looking to right as there were
two drive\vays south of said Safeway store (210). There
\vas absolutely no testimony to the contrary to Mr.
Reid's as to \vhat he was doing just prior to the accident.
Further that he was not going over 25 miles an hour (Tr.
191) \Vhich was the same speed as testified to by Mrs·
Bjorkman, the State's witness (Tr. 60) she would not
say under oath that defendant was going faster than
25 miles per hour.

POINTS OF ERROR
Appellant relies upon the points of error stated
in "Index of Points in Argument" and will not thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

fore repeat them here, but proceed with argument in
support of said points.

ARGUMENT
Point No. 1
We are of the opinion that the Court below erred
when it refused defendant's request to instruct the jury
to bring in a verdict of not guilty ( pp. 17) for the reasons that there is a complete lack of evidence to show a
causal connection between the alleged purported act or
acts of the defendant and the death of Mr. Allen. In
the bill of particulars filed in response to demand by
defendant· it sets forth the following: ''That at said
time and place, the defendant was driving said automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
in a ·careless, reckless, and unlawful manner, and with~ut du·e caution and circumspection.'' And that he drove
''his automobile into and against a bicycle upon which
Reuben F. Allen, deceased, was then and there riding
and operating across said .Main Street from west side
to the east side thereof" and that said collision occurred
in the east portion of said highway, and that -. said
Reuben F. Allen, deceased, was thrown from his bicycle onto said highway causing almost, if not, instantanious death.'' The judge submitted the cause to the
jury on these charges of criminal negligence. A discussion of the question of causal connecting between
the death of Mr. Allen and any alleged act or a lawful
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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act done in a crilninal u1anner bv defendant is therefore
'

•

w

'

.

neeessnry.
Have ,,.e in this eanse such criJ.ninal negligence and
proxin1ate cause ns is required by la",'" for a conviction of
1nanslaughter J

,,~ e

believe not·

We believe this court

is too fa1niliar \Yith the cases of State v.· L1ngman,
97 lltah 180, 91 Pae. 2nd -±57 (1939) as also the case

of State v. Busby 102 Utah 416, 131 Pac (2)510 (1942)
together 'vith the case of State v. Capps 176 P. (2)873
and the opinions written in connection there,vith to want
any extended discussion on ·proximate cause in these
cases. l;nder the opinion in State vs. Olsen, Utah, 160
Pac. (2) 427 (1945) nir. Justice Wolfe stated at page
429: t~nder the holding of State v. Lingman, 97 Ut.
180, 91 Pae. 2d 457, the State is required in a case such
as this to prove that the defendant was driving in
marked disregard for safety of others. A mere showing that the _driver of an automobile w~nt to sleep at
the wheel will not by itself sho'v a marked disregard.
In State v. Thatcher, Utah 157 P. {2) 258 (1945) it
seems that in that 1natter Thatcher was drivir;tg at an
excessive rate of speed in Oren City, when he ran into
some people walking along the shoulder of the high,vay
on the west side. Two of the walkers were killed. Commenting on that cause the Court said at page 261:
''Although the evidence may not have been
sufficient to have proven that defendant was traSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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veling as fast as 60 miles per hour as testified to
by the patrolman, nevertheless, after a careful
examination of the record, 've co~clude, that the
jury could have found from their testimony that
defendant was exceeding the speed limit and that
said speeding was a proximate cause of the accident. Had defendant been traveling within the
speed limit he would have seen the pedestrians
within range of the car's headlights for a longer
period of time, and this fact would have given
him a better opportunity to have seen the pedesrians and then turn slightly to the left, thereby
avoiding the collision.
The fact that there was a group of five
people, three girls wearing light clothing, and two
soldiers in summer uniforms walking on the
shoulder of the road but near the west edge of
the cement portion of the highway in the same
direction as the defendant's car was traveling
and that this group maintained the same relative
position on the shoulder of the highway as defendant aproached and that he veered to the
right and drove directly into them, would, in our
opinion, be sufficient evidence to justify the jury
in finding that defendant failed to keep a sufficient lookout to discover their presence in time
to avoid a collision with them.''
In the instant case as this Court vvill have observed,
Mr· Allen was coming from west in a southeasterly direction, in the middle of the block, and, intercepted the
defendant who \vas on his side of the street and watching for any traffic that Inight issue from any of the
four ( 4) lanes on the east side of 1fain Street near the
Safe,vay store. That he did see Mrs. Bjorlm1an comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing in a ""esterly direetion out of a lane on north side
of said store and sn\Y her

~top

her vehicle at the eurb

and being satisfied that she \vould proceed no further
looked ahead and it was not until then that he saw J\fr.
Allen a fe\Y feet in front of his car \vhich gave him
neither tiine nor space to do anything about it. That
~Ir ..A.llen \Yas in a place of danger is Inanifest. But
it is also conclusive that :J[r. Read had no reason to believe or asslune that anyone \Vould be cutting in front
of hun in the Iniddle of the block and that being the
case \Ye cannot see that any negligence on his part could
be said to be the proximate cause. And. too, even if
he had seen . Allen coming across the street in a southeasterly direction he nor anyone else would reasonably
think that . Allen 'vould not stop or turn directly south
on the \Vest side of the street and not endanger himself
hy trying to cut in front of defendant. Again, let us
asslune that instead of keeping an eye to. the right for
traffic that might be coming out of said lanes or for
cars that might be backing up from the curb on the
east side of said I\Iain Street, that he had kept \vatch
as to Mr. Allen anticipating that he might do what he
actually did do and 1frs. Bjorkman or someone else
would have come out of one of said lanes and a collision
had taken place causing death. Would the prosecution
hold him for manslaughter~
In 99 A.L.R· 772 in an annotation on homicidal assault in regard with the negligent driving of a car or its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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use for unlawful purpose or violation of law, it is thus
stated:
''In order that a person may be guilty of a
criminal homicide arising from the negligent operation of an automobile or its use for an unlawful purpose or in violation of law, it is uniformly
held that it must be shown that such negligent
operation, or use for an unlawful purpose or in
violation of law, was the direct and proximate
cause of the death; that is, that there was present
a casual connection between the act and the
death.''
In Jackson vs. State, 101 Ohio 152, 127 NE 870,
(1920) the Ohio Supreme Court said:
"It will ·be observed that the charge above
quoted warranted the jury in fi~ding the plain, tiff in error, Van Jackson, guilty of manslaughter, if they should find that he, while operating
his automobile at a greater rate of speed than
15 miles per hour, struck and killed the de~edent
irrespective of whether the rate of speed was
the proximate cause of the killing; and, since this
proposition of law was in no way modified by the
general charge, the square question is raised here
as to whether an accidental, unintentional killing of a person by another engaged in an unlawful act makes that person guilty · of manslaughter under the statute, irrespective of any
connection between the unlawful act and the unintentional killing, and it seems to this court that
an analysis of the illogical and absurd results
which would necessarily follow the recognition
of such a rule will answer the query.,.,
In Chandler vs. State, Oklahoma, 146 Pac. 2nd 598
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(1944) the court stated at page 603:
'~we

are a"'"are of the "rell recognized· rule
of law in civil cases that the question of proximate cause is generally a question for the jury·
This rule of law also has application in criminal
cases. But there must be evidence of its application. In crilninal cases, it has been universally held that speed alone, even though it be in
contravention of a statute, may not cause one
to be guilty of a crime.
It has been universally held that a person
may be found guilty of criminal homicide arising from negligent operation of an automobile
or its use for an unlawful purpose, or in violation of law, but it is uniformly held that it must.
be shown that such negligent operation, or use
for an unlawful purpose or in violation of law,
was the direct and proximate cause of the death;
that is, that there was a causal connection between the act and the death." (citations)
In O'Mally vs. Eagan, 43 Wyoming 233, 2 Pac. 2nd
1063, 1066, the court stated :
"In the case at bar there is no direct testinlony; if defendant's negligence was in fact the
proximate cause of the injury, it must be gathered from the circumstances shown herein. Now
speed or any other alleged negligent act of the
defendant cannot, of course, be said to have been
the proximate cause, unless the accident could
have been avoided in the absence thereof. And
counsel for the plaintiff ought to be able to point
out, by analyzing the circumstances shown by the
evidence, how the defendant would have been able
to avoid the collision, had he been in the exercise
of reasonable care.· But counsel have wholly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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failed to do so, though they have . repeatedly asserted that the jury might have rightly found that
the defendant's neglience contributed to the injury in this case.''
In J:>c~or)le vs. Young, California, 129 ·Pac. 2nd, 353
(1942) the eonrt stated at page 356:
''The driver of a vehicle overtaking a street
ear, stopped or about to stop for the purpose
of discharging passengers where there is no safety zone is required to stop vehicle at the rear
of the street car and there remain until any persons alighting have reached a place of safety.
Vehicle Code, 571. Assu1ning defendant violated
that rule, the mere violation thereof under the
circumstances did not constitute wilful misconduct or reckless disregard of, or wilful indifference to the safety of others. She testified that
she did not see the decedent until he stepped
from the street car onto her fender. The people's
witnesses stated that deceased had stepped down
and commenced to take the next step forward
'vhen he was struck. This is not a case where
defendant had an opportunity to see the deceased
for son1e distance, but still continued on her
course thus showing an element of intent to cause
injury or a high degree of probability thereof.
The judgment is reversed.''
In People vs. Townsend, Mich. 183 NW 177, (1921)
179, the court stated:
''It is gross inculpable negltgence for a
drunken man to guide and operate an automobile
upon a public highway, and one doing so and
occasioning injuries to another, causing death, is
guilty of manslaughter· It was unlawful for the
plaintiff to operate his automobile upon the pubSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lie high"~ay while he 'vas intoxicated; made unlawful by statute, and wrong in and of itself,
1nanslaughter provided the death of Agnes
Thorne 'vas a proxin1ate result of his unlawful
act.''
In Dunvill vs. State, Ind., 123 NE, ( 1919) the court

stated at page 689 :
''It is also true that, if he is acting in violation of a positive statute under circumstances
that sho'v a reckless disregard for the life and
limb of others, and this violation is the proximate
cause of the death, the law then implies an intent
to do the injury and makes him guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Whether the unlawful act
committed is the one which we have first above
indicated, or the second one pointed out, it is
always necessary that the evidence shows that the
unlawful act is the proximate cause ~f the
death".

r\.RG U~!ENT
Point No. 2
In eonnection with the subject of proximate cause
but as also foru1ing a separate point of error (assignlnent of error No. 2) con1plained of, the defendant
requested the court to charge: "If you find that Mr .
..:\lien was negligent in crossing the highway so that he
could not cross with reasonable safety in front of defendant's auto1nobile, then his acts were the sole proxinlate cause of his death and defendant must be acquitted.'' ( pp. 23) This request was refused. We believe
this request states this court vie'v as expressed in CederSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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loff vs. Whited 169 P (2nd) 777. In the instant case
~~ r. 1\llen placed himself in a hazardous part of the
street and where ordinarily a driver would not look for
a person. If Mr. Allen had been crossing at a marked
cross-,valk either in the 1niddle of the block or at an
intersection then Mr. Read might be charged with being the proxin1ate cause of his death but not so in the
rniddle of the block where there 'vas no cross-walk and
\vhere :\lr· Read was looking to his right where he might
expect either cars backing up from the east curb or cars
issuing fro1n one or all said four ( 4) lanes near Safeway
~tore.

ARGUMENT
Point No. 3
We respectfully urge that the court belo'v erred in
failing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 4
in the form requested. (pp. 19) We shall not repeat the
requested instruction but refer this Court to our index
where it is fully stated. And 've further urge that 'this
requested instruction states the law correctly and is well
bottomed. See State vs. Ha1nberg 143 A. 47, 99 A.L.R.
841 which case in our opinion approves of said instruction in the form requested. We believe further that this
refusal constitutes prejudicial error.

ARGUMENT
Point No. 4
We also respectfully urge that the court below was
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in error in refusing to give defendant's ·requested instruction No· 10 (pp. 22) '\Yhich reads: Yon are instructed gentlemen of the jury that the defendant had a right
to asswue that a person upon the high,vay 'vould exercise ordinary care, and that they would not negligently
expose the1nselves to danger, and that they would exercise ordinary c.are to ascertain the approach of motor
vehicles, and before you hold the defendant 'vas negligent in this case, you n1ust take into consideration these
assumptions which defendant had a right to rely on.

The Court below makes a notation on the requested
instruction that it was given in substance but we fail
to find it suficiently covered in any instruction given by
the Court. We believe the failure to give said requested
instruction is prejudicial eror for the same has been
held to be a most proper one in Hay vs. Fornich 250
I->. 565. We can see no good reason why the defendant
should not have had the benefit of this instruction as
pointed out such instruction 'vas held to be a proper
one in the case cited. In refusing said instruction the
jury presumably assumed that it was criminal negligence for· said defendants to assume that Mr. Allen
would act as a reasonable prudent person "\vould under
the circumstances.
ARGUMENT
Point No. 5
The Court gave the following instruction, instrucSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ti?n No. 10 pp. 26 which \Ve will repeat: If you find
that Mr. Allen was negligent in crossing the highway
so that he could not cross with reasonable safety in
front of defendant's autornobile, and that Mr. Reed was
not negligent in any vvray, then Mr. Allen's negligence
becon1es the sole proximate cause of his death and
the defendant should be acquitted, and to which instruction defendant duly excepted ( tr. 225).
In this instruction the Court below says In effect
that though Mr. Allen was negligent in crossing in
front of defendant's car and he could not do so with
reasonable safety, said Allen \vould be the proximate
cause of his death, provided, however, that Mr. Read
\Vas not negligent in any way. In other \vords if Read
'vas negligent in any way, though such negligence was
not, the proximate cause of or contributed to the cause
of Allen's death he was still guilty of manslaughter.
We do not believe such is the law, there must of necessity be a proximate cause e1nanating from said negligence and which we have discussed in point No. 1 and
'vill therefore not repeat.
ARGUMENT
Point No. 6
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for
arrest of judgment. (Tr. 223). In this motion, made in
open court and after motion for a new trial was denied,
\Ve held then and do no'v that there was no offense
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proved in the cause against ~fr. Read. This contention
of course is based upon the fact that there was no causal connection bet,veen the death of ~Ir. Allen and any
recklessness or negligence of ~[r. Read. In other words
Mr. Read's negligence or recklessness, if any, \Vas not
the proximate cause of ~Jr. Allen's death as urged in
our argument in point 1.
ARGUMENT
Point No. 7
We believe the Court belo\v erred in not giving defendant's requested instruction in full denominated by
the figures 1Y2 pp. 16. We will not here repeat the
instruction as it is stated in the index under point 7.
That part which the court refused to give reads as
follows : ''You are instructed in this connection, however, that the mere fact that you may believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defndant
committed an unlawful act not amounting to a felony,
and while committing such unlawful act, the defendant
caused the death of a human being, such is not sufficient
to sustain a charge of manslaughter. There must be in
addition, a causal connection between the commission of
the unlawful act and death."
If this part of the instructions had been given it
seerningly would have caused the jury to pause and consider what ''causal connection'' really means and that
such is not to be assumed because death resulted while
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defendant 'vas in the commission of an unlawful act. The
whole instruction is taken from People vs. Black, 295
P. 87, and in our opinion is a most proper instruction.
ARGUMENT
Point No. 8
rrhe Court was further requested not to submit the
cause to the jury at the close of the evidence on the
ground that there was no evidence to show that the collision caused the death of ~fr. Allen. (tr· 224) , This
Court will search the. record in vai:p for any testimony
that said Allen died from any injuries he received from
said collision. If we are right on this matter it 'vould
~~een1 to follo'v that the Court should have dismissed the
cause. In Abbott on Facts,_ Fifth Edition at page 360
the text reads: ''Likewise, where death is instantaneous,
the plaintiff must show that it resulted from the app!ication of the force in question.'' In support of the text
it cites Fonzone vs. Lehigh Valley Transit Co. 318 Pa.
514, 178 A 671 - the note reads : ''One suing for the
death of a person struck by a street car must prove that
death resulted from the contact of the street car with
the deceased body, as there is no presumption that the
deceased 'vas alive just before being struck." This
seemingly being the la'v the cause should never have
been submittd.
ARGUMENT
Points No. 9, 10, 11
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'Vas the Court in error "-rhen it perinittPd testhnony
and exhibit ',; r\ ~. showing Bkid Inark~~ ( rPr. 1fl~ 17' 18,
19, 20, 23, ·122, 123, 126, 127) and 2, in pern1itting one

Ronald Hadfield to

te~tif~· n~ an

expert in

eoutputin;~~·

speed of car front length of skid nulrkB and partienlarl)··

\\?hen said Hadfield or any other v.·i tness could not

sa~·

the number of· skid n1arks such computation \vas taken
fronl" (tr. 137, 141. 142. 143, 145, 147)
In our state1nent of facts \Ve have referred to the
testi1nony on these 1natters and \vherein in the transcript
it Inay be found but repeat it here although perhaps un1H_\ee~~ary. '': e believe there \vas no testin1ony to sho\v
that the skid 1narks in question \Vere made by defendant
for it 1nust be noted that ~Irs. Bjorkman, an eye \vitness
for the plaintiff, could not say that the skid marks
\Vere the defendant's (tr. 62) nor is there any evidence
\vhich showed by tread of tires or otherwise that said
1narks were made by any tires on defendant's automobile. Nor is there any testi1nony which shows how many
skid Inarks were made. If we are correct in these ·
state1nents or any of the statements of course it must
be conceded the said testimony as to all or any of these
rnatters was inadmissable for the purpose they were
or any of them were received and therefore prejudical
error. And the testimony of said Hadfield was erroneously adn1itted. So much for points 9 and 10.
In regard to point No. 11, we took exception to the
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questions put to the jury by the Court as to sub-para-

graph 3, 4 and 5 of said instruction No. 2. We are
of the opinion that there 'vas no proper evidence introduced showing or tending to show that defendant was
operating his car at or anywhere near 50 miles per
hour. Nor 'vas there any evidence to show that he was
not keeping a proper lookout nor having his car under
proper control. To substantiate these statements this
Court may merely reflect on our statement of facts and
eonsul t the references in the transcript as to this and
therefore we will not repeat.

In regards to submitting question No. 5 under instruction No· 2 as to whether certain facts as to purported criminal negligence being ''the proximate cause
of the accident and resulting death." We believe this
is sufficiently discussed under point No. 1 and will not
repeat.
ARGUMENT
Point No. 12
Point No. 12 concerns itself with the refusal of the
Court below in granting a new trial. In this we believe the Court erred for the reasons stated heretofore
in support of errors No. 1 to 11 inclusive. We are of the
opinion that the Court should have set the verdict aside
and passed no judgment on the defendant on the ground
that there were no facts showing that whatever defendant may have been guilty of did not constitute the prox-
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in1ate cause of said collision and death. In fact the
Court should have instructed the jury as 've requested
to bring in a verdict of not guilty. The Courts failurP
to do so alone and by itself constitutes reversable error.
We therefore submit that the judgment should be reversed, and the action dis1nissed, or at any event, a
ne'v trial ·be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Harvey A. Sjostrom
Attorney for Appellant.
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